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 Liability Assessments and 
Criminal Responsibility in 
Norwegian Legal History
SIRI ELISABETH BERNSSEN*
Development towards a more nuanced study of criminal responsibility, 
illustrated by an analysis of cases of infanticide registered with Hordaland 
district court, 1642-1799.  
1. Introduction and Issue
The general content of the assessment of intent (forsett) was explicitly clarified for the first 
time in a Norwegian criminal code when the 2005 Criminal Code and its §22 came into 
force on 1 October 2015. Before the Criminal Code of 1902, the subjective requirement 
for liability was directed  solely in individual regulations, and even though intent pursu-
ant to §40 in this Code was established as a general main rule, it was still up to the courts 
to report on the content of the judgement.1 Thus it is clear that the development towards 
a more and more defined and nuanced study of criminal liability took place gradually. In 
this article, we will go even further back in time and look at how the discussion of liability 
and responsibility changed between 1642 and 1799, with particular emphasis on intent 
and related criteria. This will be achieved by analysing cases of infanticide registered with 
the Hordaland district court (bygdeting), which at this time was the first instance in the 
legal system. 
In this context, infanticide refers to the killing of an unborn or newborn child with the 
intention of concealing the pregnancy. Strict sexual morals and legislation in the wake 
*         Cand.jur. This article is based on findings in connection to the author’s master’s thesis, Faculty of 
Law, University of Bergen; Bernssen ‘Skam, skuld og straff ’(2017). The thesis was published on 
BORA (http://bora.uib.no/handle/1956/16182), 1 July 2017.
1 Grøning, Husabø and Jacobsen, Frihet, forbrytelse og straff (Fagbokforlaget 2016) p. 223.
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of the Reformation was one of the reasons leading to an increase of this type of crime in 
around the 17th century. Therefore, infanticide was defined as a separate criminal cate-
gory in a 1635 ordinance.2 These rules were later continued in King Christian V’s Nor-
wegian Code of 1687 and hence remained in force as applicable law until the adoption of 
the 1842 Criminal Code. 
Infanticide as a criminal category is far from unknown in legal history, and is referred 
to in a number of publications from the ‘Court records project’ at the University of Oslo.3 
Nevertheless, there are few examinations of infanticide in the Early Modern Period tak-
ing a legal approach, and material and procedural law at the district court are not anal-
ysed to any great extent.4 Furthermore, the broad scope – in terms of both geography and 
time – means that this study is appropriate for uncovering new aspects in the processing 
of cases of infanticide at the district court.
The content of the theoretical accounts published in the latter half of the 18th century 
will also be discussed as a reference for district court practice. Looking at legal practice 
at the first instance in the light of their contemporary theories provides a good starting 
point for the forthcoming report. In addition to the perceptions of the various legal scien-
tists, this also provides an insight into how these concepts proved decisive for the broad 
layer of appliers of the law. Thus the central concern is to examine how the various players 
perceived the content of the law and how changes to these notions proved decisive in the 
practising of the regulations on infanticide, and hence also on the practising of the study 
of criminal responsibility.
The background for this article is formed by an observation of the fact that people ac-
cused of infanticide were consistently handed less strict penalties towards the end of the 
18th century.5 This discovery was made in connection with a review of the preserved legal 
reports from the Hordaland district court from 1642 to 1799. More specifically, we can 
see that the prescribed death penalty was used less and less frequently in instances that 
appeared to be covered by the descriptions of the deeds in the relevant criminal regula-
tion. This happened despite the fact that the relevant legislation was unchanged through-
out the entire period investigated. One of the crucial factors for the change appears to be 
a more nuanced assessment in which elements of subjective liability, causative links and 
assessments of unlawfulness appear to be formulated more and more clearly. To analyse 
legal practice in cases of infanticide could therefore provide an insight into a small part of 
2 Nielsen, Letferdige qvindfolk (Københavns Universitet 1980) pp. 3-6. 
3 See <http://www.hf.uio.no/iakh/tjenester/kunnskap/samlinger/tingbok/> (Accessed 20 June 
2017).
4 However, Nielsen 1980 discusses the legal approach in infanticide cases registered by Nørrejylland 
Appellant court (Landsting) in Denmark between 1719 and 1805. 
5 Based on an analysis of court rulings in connection with the author’s master’s thesis.
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the development of the concept of liability.6 More specifically, the purpose of this report 
is to a) examine differences and similarities in how liability were reported and practised 
in theory and at district courts, and b) look at the consequences and discuss what could 
have caused the development we see, particularly towards the end of the 18th century.
2. The Administrative Body as a Legal Institution, and Method When 
Using District Court Records 
It is necessary to place the analysis of the district court reports in context if we are to 
understand the content and scope of the following discussion. Therefore, we will briefly 
consider the district court as a conflict resolution body, as well as the methodological 
approach applied. 
The legal system in Norway was reformed in 1590, and the district courts were – inter 
alia – constituted as a compulsory first instance for all legal cases.7 The office of district 
magistrate was set up just one year later due to the need then arising for a legally trained 
player. The job of the recorder was initially to inform the appointed members of the 
jury of applicable law and to write down what was said, done and decided at the meet-
ings of the district court. Since the magistrates were responsible for, and participated in, 
a number of different district courts throughout the course of the year, they gradually 
became experienced appliers of the law. Over the next century, their role in court there-
fore developed, and according to Christian V’s Norwegian Code the district magistrate 
became the sole judge in all minor cases, inter alia.8 Still, the skills were nevertheless ex-
perience-based, and legal training was only first made mandatory at the time of the 1736 
Examination Ordinance.9
What now constitutes the county of Hordaland was largely divided into five juris-
dictions in the 17th and 18th century. Besides Bergen town court and Rosendal barons 
court, the district court jurisdictions of Nordhordland, Sunnhordland and Hardanger 
made up the three largest entities in terms of geography.10 The court records preserved for 
6 E.g. Jacobsen, Hagerup og den strafferettslege ansvarslæra (Fagbokforlaget 2017).
7 Sunde, Speculum legale (Fagbokforlaget 2005) p. 209.
8 King Christian V’s’s Norwegian Code, 1687. University of Oslo: Department of Archaeology, 
Conservation and History. Available from <http://www.hf.uio.no/iakh/forskning/prosjekter/
tingbok/kilder/chr5web/chr5register.html> (Accessed 20 June 2017), ref. Dobbe, Blant Granner 
og myndigheter (Tingbokprosjektet 1996) pp. 45-47.
9 Nilsen, Lov og rett (Tingbokprosjektet 2002) p. 40.
10 Sunde, ‘Quind folch’, - Kvinner og tilhøyrsle mellom 1642 og 1802, 7 Från Schlyters lustgård 
(2007a) pp. 117-152, at 119. The geographical scope of the latter district nevertheless varies some 
throughout the examination period, ref. Bernssen annex 1.
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the latter three have been transcribed over the past few decades, so we now have access to 
the legal records of these district courts in digital text documents. 
This transcription has two consequences for research into the field. Firstly, material 
has been made available for analysis without the reader needing any prior knowledge of 
Gothic handwriting. In earlier studies of court records from various parts of the country, 
either the original sources were used directly or smaller elements of the registers were 
transcribed specifically for the purpose. For the most part, researchers with a historical 
background have used the preserved legal information in this way, which of course does 
impact on the angle taken in the research. To uncover nuances in the legal practice re-
quired prior legal knowledge, and so little of this has taken place. Hence, these transcrip-
tions pave the way for a greater range of research into district court practice, not least 
from a legal angle. 
The other consequence of the transcription and digitisation is that this provides the 
opportunity to review large volumes of text while searching for specific information. 
Thus digital searching has made it possible in this study to reveal all preserved cases of 
infanticide from over a period of more than 150 years; previously, this would only have 
been possible by reading through tens of thousands of handwritten pages.11 These cases 
have been found by searching on relevant terms such as ‘secret’ (døglsmaal), ‘child/baby’ 
(barn/foster) and ‘birth’ (fødsel).12 Consequently it is only necessary to review text man-
ually if it contains any of these terms.13 In this study, reviews of this kind have been car-
ried out from the preserved court records for Nordhordland (1642-1799), Sunnhordland 
(1648-1799) and Hardanger (1648-1772). However, several of the court records from this 
period are missing in all three districts, and hence a number of cases of infanticide have 
probably been lost.14 The court records from Hardanger have not been fully transcribed 
as yet, and so these have only been examined up to and including 1772. 
Investigation has uncovered a total of 32 genuine cases of infanticide. These cases re-
late to women who were proven to have given birth, the baby was dead, and a judgement 
was pronounced on the case with regard to the extent to which the situation was covered 
11 There are more than 15,000 printed pages for Nordhordland alone; ref. Sunde 2007a p. 118.
12 Words and forms discovered/used in the search are secret(ly) (døls/dølgs/duls-maal/mall), 
concealed/hidden/secret (døll, dult/dulgt/dulg(-e)), child/ baby (barn/baren/foster), born/
birth (fød/født/fødsel), childbirth (barsel), pregnant/with child (svanger), executed/put to death 
(ombragt). Only parts of search terms, e.g. just ‘døl/dul’, have been used if it has been possible 
to do so without resulting in excessive numbers of hits. All the ‘genuine’ cases presented hits on 
various forms of the word ‘dølge/dølgsmål’, while all relevant cases presented hits on ‘barn’. It is 
not worth searching on legal regulations as the references are so varied.
13 More about the method and challenges linked with research of this type can be found in Sunde 
2007/2008 pp. 118-120. 
14 In total, court records are missing from around 25% of years during the period examined, ref. 
Bernssen 2017 annex 1.
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by the rules relating to infanticide. In addition, another eleven cases have been found 
in which women have been suspected of the same crime to a greater or lesser extent, 
but where there was no assessment or judgement in which the rules on infanticide was 
applied. Examples of this are where the parents have run away before the case went be-
fore the district court, where accusations of pregnancy have proved to be unfounded, or 
where witnesses could prove that the baby was born alive and died of natural causes. One 
thing these cases have in common is the fact that the court does not explicitly discuss the 
content of the regulations in question. As this study relates to specific interpretation and 
subsumption of the rules on infanticide, these are therefore omitted. 
Table 1: Occurrence of cases according to decade and district (NH = Nordhordland, SH 
= Sunnhordland, HVL = Hardanger)
1640 1650 1660 1670 1680 1690 1700 1710 1720 1730 1740 1750 1760 1770 1780 1790
NH 1 0 0 1 1 2 2 1 0 1 1 1 2 0 0 1
SH 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 2 0 1 2 0 3 3 0
HVL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
According to this table, the average occurrence of genuine cases of infanticide stood 
at around one every five years. As regards occurrences in relation to other serious crimes, 
this can be illustrated by means of a study of the criminal cases for which appeals were 
submitted to Bergen Appellant Court (Lagting) between 1702 and 1737.15 There were a 
total of 43 murder cases in this period, no fewer than 23 of which involved the murder of 
unborn or newborn babies.16 In this context, it is also necessary to mention that there are 
probably substantial numbers of unrecorded cases of infanticide. By way of illustration, 
it may be noted that Kari Knudsdatter from Hardanger committed no fewer than four 
infanticides before she was eventually caught and accused.17
When the relevant legal reports have been picked, the essential information has been 
recorded and each individual case has been subject to a legal analysis. Nevertheless, a 
couple of remarks have to be specified with regard to how much can be made out from 
the various reports. As stated, the legal reports were mainly written down by a recorder 
within each district. Initially these were the magistrates, who became experienced legal 
players and a judge in the district court. According to The Norwegian Code of 1687 1-8-3 
the district court judges were obliged to write the report as the cases were dealt with in 
15 As well as being the Court of Appeal for the three investigated district court jurisdictions, the 
territorial jurisdiction further included eight judicial districts, ref. Hansen, Bergen Lagting (T. 
Hansen 1993) p. 12.
16 See Hansen 1993 pp. 252-253. 
17 SAB: Tingbok for Hardanger 1767-1772 fs. 78b-79b.
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court. However, the district court judges not only came from other parts of Norway, but 
generally from other parts of Denmark-Norway. Therefore, the language and culture in 
the district could seem strange to them, particularly at the start of their careers.18 There 
is also evidence indicating that the district court judges did not always write the reports 
directly at court, but that this information was entered in the court records afterwards 
on the basis of notes.19 Thirdly, the variation in scope and level of detail in legal records 
establishes that the district court judges handled their cases in very individual ways. For 
instance, the cases referred examined in this article vary from two to more than forty 
handwritten folio pages, but this does not necessarily reflect the complexity of the indi-
vidual case. Thus one must adopt a certain critical approach to the historical material. 
With this in mind, we will now look at legal practice in the specific cases. 
3. Infanticide and the Starting Point for Legal Handling at the District 
Court
As stated, this study is based on the legal court records relating to cases of infanticide. 
As well as establishing aggravated death penalties for premeditated murder in The Nor-
wegian Code of 1687 6-6-7, concealed births resulting in a dead child were placed on a 
par with premeditated murder. According to the following article 6-6-8, therefore, any 
woman who gave birth to a child without asking for help should be sentenced to death 
if the child died. Probably due to the issue of evidence, the latter rule is largely what we 
see practised at the district court. When the king was granted both legislative and judi-
cial power by the King Act of 1665, written law was also the only formal legal source.20 
Despite this strict methodology, nevertheless we see that the practising of the said rules 
changed. To provide a starting point for the following thesis, it may be appropriate to 
illustrate this phenomenon by means of two cases heard by the district court in Sunn-
hordland, sixty six years apart. 
The first case was heard on 26 April 1712 by the district court in Strandebarm in Har-
danger. Zidsele Samsonsdatter, 22 years old, was accused, suspected of being responsi-
ble for the death of her newborn baby. She had fallen pregnant due to a relationship with 
her sweetheart, and he was also the only person she told about the pregnancy. When she 
told the baby’s father that she no longer could feel any life in the baby, about ten days 
before the birth, he earnestly asked her to conceal the pregnancy for as long as possible. 
Zidsele thus gave birth to the baby alone in her bed in the loft where she lived, without 
18 See Dobbe 1996 p. 24.
19 Sunde, Silence, Lies and Rhetoric in the Legal Discourse in Court in Reading past legal texts, ed. 
Michalsen (Unipax 2006) pp. 113-133, at 128.
20 See Sunde 2005 p. 277.
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calling for help. After that, she concealed the stillborn baby in a chest, where it was dis-
covered four or five days later.21 
Sixty six years later, on 28 March 1778, Kari Bårdsdatter Lundøen was in approx-
imately the same situation. At the district court meeting at Våge in Sunnhordland, she 
admitted having concealed her pregnancy from everyone except the baby’s father. She 
also gave birth alone in her usual bed in a loft, somewhat distanced from people and the 
other farm buildings on the estate. Kari also hid her baby in a chest in her room, and 
threw the afterbirth on the ground. When the child was found two weeks later, she also 
claimed that it was stillborn.22 
Both of these women were accused of breaching the aforementioned regulations on 
concealment of birth and infanticide in the Norwegian Code of 1687. Nevertheless, we 
see that there was a difference in the outcomes of the two cases referred to. While Zid-
sele was found guilty according to the regulations on concealment of birth and infanti-
cide and was sentenced to ‘lose her life’, Kari – sixty six years later – escaped with an 
arbitrary penalty of lifetime in prison. Significant elements in the latter case were – inter 
alia – that it was not proven that ‘the child was born alive’ or that Kari had a ‘murderous 
intent’.23 
These two cases indicate that a development was taking place which had major prac-
tical consequences for the women accused of concealment of a childbirth. As stated, 
the legal regulation of infanticide was the same up to 1842. To investigate the content 
and basis of the change in the legal assessment it is therefore necessary to analyse the 
interaction of external circumstances, substantive law and the legal players operating at 
the time.
4. Regulations on Concealment of Birth and Infanticide, and Criminal 
Responsibility up to 1735
Although the appliers of the law throughout history have been without the theoretical 
and linguistic tools we use to depict the study of liability, this does not mean that the 
basic concept of nuanced assessments of criminal liability was absent. When it comes to 
distinguishing worthiness of penalty between deliberate and accidental actions, we find 
such things mentioned as long ago as in the legal texts of the Middle Ages.24 Christian 
V’s Norwegian Code of 1687 had no general rules regulating the requirement for liabil-
21 SAB: Rettsprotokoll Hardanger, Voss og Lysekloster 1711-1713 fs. 76-79.
22 SAB: Rettsprotokoll Sunnhordland 1777-1782 fs. 23b-26b.
23 SAB: Rettsprotokoll Sunnhordland 1777-1782 fs. 26.
24 Skeie, Den norske strafferett (Olaf Norlis forlag 1937) p. 71.
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ity, but individual criminal regulations indicate that intent was required for the strictest 
penalties.25 Harm as a consequence of negligent actions was also regulated explicitly to a 
certain extent, inter alia by means of a separate chapter on ‘accidental actions’.26
Nevertheless, the two regulations relating to infanticide did not include any such spe-
cific differentiation. As stated, the regulations are indicated in Norwegian Laws 6-6-7 and 
6-6-8, worded as follows: 
Art. 7
Loose women who kill their baby should lose their neck, and the head be set upon a 
pole. 
Art. 8
Should any loose woman be with child and she conceal her childbirth and not use the 
properly appointed means that could serve her and the baby in such instance, and the 
same child is gone, or if its stillbirth is accelerated, or if it is otherwise weakened to the 
point of death, it shall be considered that she had killed her baby with intent.
The aforementioned death penalty is specified in article 7. As well as being beheaded, 
these women’s heads would be placed on poles. The regular penalty for murder was a life 
for a life, according to the Norwegian Code of 1687 6-6-1. The infamous or aggravated 
element pursuant to 6-6-7, that the head were to be placed on a pole, thus reflected a 
greater degree of severity in the act of the murder of an innocent child.27 As well as the 
fact that the child was killed by its closest carer, it was also not baptised and could not be 
buried in consecrated ground. According to popular belief, their souls were thus doomed 
to eternal damnation. In the case of the aggravated death penalty, the person put to death 
would also be buried at the place of execution, and the women found guilty of infanticide 
would therefore suffer the same fate as their babies.28
Article 8 states, as indicated, that mothers who gave birth under the circumstances 
described in greater detail would be judged as if they ‘had killed her baby with intent’; that 
is, they would be handed down the penalty specified above. First of all, the woman had 
to be a ‘loose woman’, which in this instance meant that she had fallen pregnant outside 
25 E.g. the Norwegian code of 1687 6-7-1, ref. Skeie 1937 p. 152.
26 The Norwegian code of 1687 6-11.
27 See Skeie 1937 p. 144.
28 Nielsen, Lætferdige Qvindfolk (Delta 1982) p. 83.
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of marriage.29 Secondly, she had to have given birth in ‘secret’ without using the ‘properly 
appointed means’. Thus this regulation affected women who gave birth to their babies in 
secret without calling for help from midwives or other experienced women who could 
help and supervise the birth.30 To be found guilty of murder, the final condition was – 
naturally – that the child was ‘gone’ or ‘its stillbirth is accelerated, or if it is otherwise weak-
ened’. If all these conditions were met, the woman would be ‘considered’ to have killed the 
child. This regulation was therefore based on a presumption of liability and criminal re-
sponsibility without explicitly paving the way for exceptions where the child was actually 
stillborn, or for a broader and more nuanced assessment of excusing factors. 
In the early part of the period under investigation, such presumption of guilt appears 
to have been used as a basis relatively uncritically. Of the 15 women who were found to 
have given birth to a child alone prior to 1735, 13 were sentenced to death. This means, 
as we have seen, that Zidsele was sentenced to death for murder in 1712 even though her 
baby probably died in her womb several weeks before the birth. In another case from 
1687, the fact that the birth took place during serious illness and that the mother of the 
woman was notified and present during the birth, does not seem to have been judged as 
a somewhat extenuating circumstance.31 Finally, we also have a number of cases where 
women have given birth abruptly, clearly prematurely, and thus have given birth without 
the prescribed assistance. By way of example, the maid Ingerj Larsdatter gave birth to 
twins in her bed in 1705, and according to herself she was in about the fifth month of the 
pregnancy.32 When her mistress – who was also the mother of the father of the babies – 
discovered this, she ordered Ingerj to get rid of the babies without telling any of the men 
in the household about the pregnancy. In all of these cases, it is intuitively apparent that 
the mothers had no obvious liability for the death of their children. Nevertheless, they 
were sentenced to death as if they ‘had killed her baby with intent’. Thus the judges in the 
court of first instance appear to have followed the legal text literally, and the issue of crim-
inal responsibility was solved by an assessment of whether the prescribed circumstances 
relating to the birth were objectively present. 
The fact that the notion of a more nuanced assessment of the basis of liability was 
nevertheless not far off, is illustrated by a relatively sensational acquittal from Nordhord-
land in 1705.33 Here, 20-year-old Søgni Olsdatter gave birth to a child in a room with her 
foster parents, after having fallen pregnant with her foster uncle. As she had not avoided 
29 Brorson, Forsøg til den siette Bogs Fortolkning i Christian den Femtes danske og norske Lov 
(Gyldendal 1791) p. 141. 
30 Hedegaard, Fierde forsøg til en Dansk Juridisk dissertasion angaaende Barnefødsel i Dølgsmaal 
(Frid. Chr. Pelt 1756) p. 37.
31 SAB: Rettsprotokoll Nordhordland 1685-1687 fs. 70-72, 73-74b.
32 SAB: Rettsprotokoll Sunnhordland 1705 fs. 53-57b, 76-78b.
33 SAB: Rettsprotokoll Nordhordland 1704-1705 fs. 68b-71b, 100b-101b.
68
Siri Elisabeth Bernssen
‘appropriate locations’ and revealed the child as soon as she was back on her feet, it was 
concluded that Søgni had not ‘deliberately wished to give birth in secret; and concealed 
her child’. She is therefore one of two women who was fully acquitted of concealment of 
birth and infanticide by the district court, despite having found that she had given birth 
to a child who was dead.34 As we shall see below, the temporarily appointed district judge 
Hans Theiste appeared to be before his time in several ways as regards the assessments 
made in this case. In this context, it is particularly interesting to note that the assessments 
of the intentions of the accused appeared to be discussed as a separate element in connec-
tion with the explicitly formulated terms in the Norwegian Code of 1687 6-6-8. However, 
as the judgement nevertheless stands out as a clear deviation from the legal situation, it 
will not be examined in greater detail here. Still, the case serves as an example of the fact 
that the notion of a more comprehensive and nuanced assessment of liability did exist, 
but at this time it did not appear to have gained a foothold in the deliberations of the 
court of first instance concerning rules relating to concealment of birth and infanticide.
5. Traces of a Development
As stated initially, there were relatively major changes in the outcomes of district court 
cases towards the end of the 18th century. Without placing too much importance on 
pure statistics, we can see that of the seventeen women found to have concealed their 
births between 1736 and 1799, six got an arbitrary prison sentence. No fewer than five 
of these verdicts were handed down after 1774, and at the same period only two of the 
women were sentenced to death according to the Norwegian Code of 1687. Thus one can 
see a clear development in the practice of the rules relating to concealment of birth and 
infanticide. 
We also find signs of development towards a more nuanced interpretation in the the-
ory. The first preserved report of the rule relating to concealment of birth and infanticide 
was resented by Danish lawyer and legal expert Christian Ditlev Hedegaard (1700-1781) 
in his Dissertation of 1756.35 In this, he wrote – inter alia – that one ‘did not see, pursuant 
to this article, that one can and should sentence a wretched person to death as soon as it is 
only proven that she has given birth in secret and that the baby is dead’. Thus, he indirectly 
34 In the second case (SAB: Rettsprotokoll Sunnhordland 1705 fs. 22b), the woman appears to have 
been acquitted due to the social position of her father, ref. Hansen 1993 p. 134. The assessment 
here also appears to be less based on the Norwegian code of 1687 6-6-8, and the woman was 
sentenced to death when the case was later brought before Bergen Appellant court. In his line of 
defence, her father emphasised that Sille had not proceeded ‘as is usually the case when a woman 
has such thoughts and evil in her mind’, but no corresponding assessment of intent was repeated 
by the court.
35 Björne, Patrioter och institutionalister (Nerenius & Santérus förlag 1995) p. 174.
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stated that an assessment must be made of the explicit conditions in the Norwegian Code 
of 1687 6-6-8. If a woman was able to prove that the child was premature and/or stillborn, 
and that she had not had a ‘malicious intent’, Hedegaard stated that the penalty should 
be less severe.36 In other words, it was necessary to take into account both subjective lia-
bility and other potentially excusing circumstances when considering the reaction to the 
breach of the law. 
If the woman could not be held responsible for the actual death of the child, later legal 
professor Jens Bing Dons (1734-1802) claimed in 1763 that she could not be sentenced 
to death.37 In 1791, his colleague Christian Brorson (1762-1835) went even further and 
stated full acquittal in such cases.38 The latter two appear first and foremost to link the 
reduction in penalty to the logical flaw in judging someone to have killed a child who was 
already dead, and does not refer explicitly to any subjective liability assessments. How-
ever, Brorson also refers to the legal regulation of accidental actions, and points out that 
it could not have been the king’s intention to provide death penalties where the parents 
were ‘unfortunate enough to become the cause of their child’s death, though they wished to 
neither harm nor kill it’.39 
As regards subjective liability, Professor Lauritz Nørregaard (1745-1804) really ap-
pears to separate this out as an argument with independent significance in the field of 
criminal law as referred to. In agreement with what was stated by Brorson three years 
later, he wrote in his lectures of 1788 that – firstly – if a woman could ‘prove fully’ that she 
was not the cause of her child’s death, she had to be fully acquitted. Furthermore, he also 
stated that if a woman could ‘provide a presumption’ that she did not have ‘intent to kill her 
baby’, but was solely ‘culpable or negligent’, she should not be sentenced to death.40 In ad-
dition to the fact that there had to be causative links between the woman’s actions and the 
child’s death, the fact that this had to have been her intention was another requirement 
that was set forth as necessary for the death penalty to be pronounced.
Viewed overall, there were therefore major changes in higher legal circles with regard 
to interpretations of the regulations on concealment of birth and infanticide. Compared 
with the apparently unnuanced legal interpretation by the district court up to 1735, this 
transition appears to have been relatively radical. The theoretical accounts thus provided 
an apparent basis for a new dimension of assessments at the district courts. As stated, 
36 See Hedegaard 1756 p. 62.
37 See Björne 1995 p. 164, Dons and Hesselberg, Juridisk Collegium Tredie part (Frantz Christian 
Mummes Enkes Boghandling 1763) p. 302.
38 See Björne 1995 p. 178.
39 See Brorson 1791 p. 142. By referring to the King’s practice of pardoning, Brorson goes a lot 
further by stating that the death penalty was only handed down in cases where the woman had 
killed the child actively, ref. ibid. p. 145.
40 Nørregaard, Forelæsninger over den Danske og Norske Private Ret: fierde deel (1788) p. 155.
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these comments emerged from the mid-1750s, and it may seem as though the mindset 
represented there gradually made a great impact on the assessments of the judges at the 
courts of the first instance in western Norway. As we will see below, there was apparently 
also a development in practice both previously and independently of these publications. 
The content of the legal comments was thus probably itself influenced by a development 
in legal perceptions that was already taking place. 
6. District Court Cases, 1736-1799
As regards practice, we can essentially see – in line with the specified legal comments – 
two changes in the assessment of cases from 1736 onwards. In addition to assessment of 
subjective liability – which we will return to shortly – greater and greater emphasis was 
placed on whether the child was alive at birth and consequently on whether the mother 
was the cause of its death. Discussion of this matter was of particular relevance following 
a decree in an ordinance dated 22 May 1751 concerning medical examination and autop-
sy in all murder cases.41 Prior to this, such examination appears only to have taken place 
in one case.42 Initially, the district court appears to have worked on the basis that as long 
as there was a ‘certain presumption’ that the child had been alive, any mother who gave 
birth alone had to be deemed liable for its death.43 This nevertheless appears to be chang-
ing beyond the 1770s, and in the case against Kari Bårdsdatter in 1778 the court states, 
inter alia, that ‘as there is no evidence that the child was born alive (...) due to doubts this 
court does not find (…) it appropriate (…) to pass a death penalty’.44 
The second element to which more and more importance vas attached, as we can see, 
is – as stated – an assessment of subjective liability; even though this assessment was 
made more implicit than explicit, particularly in the beginning, which we can clearly see 
in the occurrence of comments linked with words such as ‘volition’ (vilje), ‘intent’ (for-
sett) or what was referred to as ‘thought’ (tanke) prior to the birth. Other corresponding 
wordings that are used more sporadically are ‘intention’ (intensjon), ‘necessary’ (om å 
gjere) or – in instances where the father was also involved – whether the parents ‘agreed’ 
(einige) beforehand on how the birth should happen. Prior to 1735, such assessments ap-
pear to have been made by the court only four times, including in the case of acquittal in 
1705 already referred to. After 1735, however, this was recorded in no fewer than 16 out 
of 17 cases. We thus see an apparently very abrupt transition, where the issue of whether 
41 See Nielsen 1980 pp. 3-16.
42 SAB: Rettsprotokoll Nordhordland 1743-1748 fs. 173b-177.
43 SAB: Rettsprotokoll Nordhordland 1754-1760 fs. 360.
44 SAB: Rettsprotokoll Sunnhordland 1777-1782 fs. 26-26b.
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the punishable outcome was the result of a deliberate action went from not being dis-
cussed explicitly to being recognised as an important part of the assessment. 
Even though we see an abrupt increase in various discussions relating to subjective 
liability and various excusing elements, it appears to take time before these assessments 
caused any genuine changes in the outcome of infanticide cases at the district court. De-
cline in actual executions during the 18th century nevertheless indicates that women 
were either handed down reduced penalties in the appellate courts or were pardoned by 
the king. 45 It is difficult to say, without more extensive study, whether this decline took 
place due to a change in the assessment of liability, but it is possible that a change in legal 
perception first had consequences in the higher courts. 
The first case of an arbitrary penalty at the district court came as early as 1743, with 
the case against Guri Haldorsdatter Uglehuus. After this it took more than 30 years be-
fore the next woman escaped the prescribed death penalty for concealment of birth and 
infanticide in a district court in the county of Hordaland. Even in this first case, we can 
nevertheless see signs that the assessments of the judges at the courts of first instance 
were making subtle distinctions and extending the discussions of the statutory condi-
tions. Initially, it was clear in this case that Guri had given birth without the prescribed 
assistance and that her baby then died. Nevertheless, from the conclusion of judgement 
it is clear that she could not be handed down a penalty according to the Norwegian Code 
of 1687 6-6-8 as the child had been born so prematurely that ‘it is not possible to consider 
that it could have been killed by human hands’ or that it ‘was concealed with such intent’.46 
Thus the content of the rules on concealment of birth and infanticide appears to have 
been taken to include both a causative requirement and a requirement for subjective lia-
bility. In this case, it was nevertheless very clear that Guri herself did not cause the child’s 
death, and so the issue was not taken to extremes.
As regards the arguments in the judgements otherwise, we can see a relatively clear 
difference between the cases ending with the death penalty between 1736 and 1774, and 
the cases ending with arbitrary penalties from 1774 onwards.47 In the earliest decisions, 
where assessments of themes resembling intent and the condition of the child were dis-
cussed in greater detail, criminal liability was largely ascertained on the basis of one or 
more of three elements: a) the pregnancy was not obvious prior to the birth, b) the birth 
took place in a solitary location, and/or c) the woman hid the child after the birth. In 
45 See Hansen 1993 p. 252-253, ref. Bernssen 2017 Annex 6 and Sørnes (2014) Ondskap: De 
henrettede 1772-1876 Available from: <http://www.ondskap.org/de-henrettede-1772-1876.
html> (Accessed 20 June 2017).
46 SAB: Rettsprotokoll Sunnhordland 1741-1746 fs. 111. 
47 The two cases ending with the death penalty after 1774 were different in this context, as one 
case (SAB: Rettsprotokoll Sunnhordland 42 1782-1787 fs.35b-41) involved murder with a knife, 
while in the other case the woman (SAB: Rettsprotokoll Nordhordland 1796-1802 fs 51b-58) 
had given birth to another child in secret before.
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contrast to the acquittal case against Søgni Olsdatter as specified previously, where these 
appear to have been used as cumulative conditions, in the other cases they do not ap-
pear to have been discussed consistently or systematically.48 In cases from 1774 onwards, 
however, the arguments appear to be gradually more nuanced and a greater emphasis has 
been placed on excusing circumstances. 
As regards the events prior to the birth, elements other than whether the pregnancy 
had been announced also have a part to play. For instance, two women had acquired baby 
clothes, which indicated that they intended to keep their children.49 If the birth took place 
alone, it was asked whether the woman had attempted and/or had opportunities to get 
help. In the case against Kari Bårdsdatter as referred to, it was thus stated in the conclu-
sion of judgement that – inter alia – her bed in the hayloft was located so far away from 
the other buildings on the farm that ‘nothing of that which has been proven contradicts’ the 
fact that she attempted to call for help, as she claimed.50 As regards the treatment of the 
child after birth, it was to the advantage of the woman if the umbilical cord was cared for, 
as this meant she had attempted to save the child’s life.51 The fact that a ‘young and simple 
woman could be unskilled in what to do in the event of birth of an infant’ is also deemed to 
be extenuating circumstances.52
The change in the outcome of these cases appeared to be the result of an overall assess-
ment of subjective intent on the one hand, and on the other of the more specific issue of 
whether the mother was responsible in practice for the death of the child. Due to varia-
tion in presentation and clarity of the referred arguments, it is often difficult to determine 
whether either element was conclusive in the individual cases. One example where the 
lack of intention to kill nevertheless appeared to have been of conclusive importance is 
the 1776 case against Christie Guldbrandsdatter. As well as acquiring baby clothes, she 
had agreed with the father of her child that he would go to her parents and announce 
her pregnancy; he had already announced it to his closest family. In addition, Christie 
gave birth five weeks prematurely, was unable to get help during the birth, and had tied 
the baby’s umbilical cord. The report states that even though she should not have been 
alone in a cold loft when the birth was imminent, she could not be sentenced to death as 
circumstances proved that she had no ‘thoughts to take the life of the child that she was ex-
pecting’. Although the fact that there was no proof that this child was born alive probably 
48 These three elements coincide with the conditions in the Swedish regulation on ‘infanticide’ 
dating back to 1734. Hedegaard refers to the first of these in his dissertation, and it is possible 
that this has a connection, ref. Hedegaard 1756 p. 212. 
49 SAB: Rettsprotokoll Sunnhordland 1772-1777 fs. 273 and SAB: Rettsprotokoll Sunnhordland 
1787-1792 fs. 169b-182.
50 SAB: Rettsprotokoll Sunnhordland 1777-1782 fs. 26.
51 SAB: Rettsprotokoll Sunnhordland 1772-1777 fs. 271b-273b.
52 SAB: Rettsprotokoll Sunnhordland 1782-1787 fs. 318.
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had a part to play, the assessment of intent appears to have played a very central part. It 
can also be noted that this case took place more than a decade before the work of Nørre-
gaard and Brorson was published, which indicates that the intent of the mother already 
had an established position in district court practice before it appeared in legal literature.
7. Arbitrary Penalties
In contrast to the two 1705 cases of acquittal as referred to, we can see that all the women 
who avoided the death penalty from 1743 onwards were sentenced to prison for between 
six years and life for their handling of the childbirth. As the rules on concealment of birth 
and infanticide are the only regulations explicitly referring to this type of crime, this pen-
alty is non-statutory.53 The question is what provided the foundation for these – despite 
everything – relatively strict penalties, as there was no regulation of this kind in existence 
in the field.
As regards the appeals, we can see examples of Bergen Appellant Court overturning 
the death penalty in cases of infanticide and issuing prison sentences instead as early 
as in 1730.54 In cases where the accused was pardoned by the king, we also sometimes 
see penalties reduced to imprisonment and fines.55 Thus it may appear that the district 
court adapted to the practice of the higher courts by using imprisonment as a substitute 
for beheading, if the conditions indicated that a less severe penalty would be applicable. 
It is nevertheless interesting to study what basis the judges in the court of first instance 
appeared to apply in order to come to this conclusion.
In the case against Christie Guldbrandsdatter in 1776, it emerges that ‘for her negli-
gence’ she had ‘to pay penalties of 6 rdr: for her intercourse outside marriage, and to work 
at Bergen Prison for 8 years’.56 It’s the only one of the six cases involving arbitrary penalties 
in which we find an alternative, subjective form of liability referred to explicitly. In the 
two cases that ends with life sentences, the grounds for the penalty state that despite the 
fact the women did not intend to kill their children, and that the babies were probably 
stillborn, they both nevertheless ‘worked so much in secret’ that if ‘the child was born alive’ 
they would ‘probably have done something to hasten the child’s death (…) [and] therefore 
53 Brorson refers to a legal unity in respect of the legal regulation of negligence when he argues 
in favour of arbitrary penalties in cases involving concealment of birth. If young children who 
were unable to look after themselves were to die in accidents, according to the Norwegian code 
of 1687 6-11-13 the parents would make ‘public confession and give money to the poor according 
to their wealth’. As we can see, this regulation does not justify a prison sentence.
54 See Hansen 1993 p. 123.
55 See Hansen 1993 p. 134.
56 SAB: Rettsprotokoll Sunnhordland 1772-1777 fs. 273b.
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should suffer an exemplary penalty’.57 In the three remaining cases, the grounds for the 
arbitrary penalties are not stated in further detail, other than the fact that the accused 
were sentenced to 6 years of prison as a result of their ‘very suspicious’ behaviour, their 
‘illegal actions’ or their ‘crime’.58 
As we can see, reports on the grounds for the alternative penalties are sparse. Nor 
does it always seem as though the judges in the court of first instance themselves were 
capable of defining and giving reasons as to why these women, despite everything, had to 
be held liable for their actions. To a certain degree, the results may appear to be based on 
the fact that the women’s actions were deemed to be reprehensible and indefensible. The 
modern wording of the Criminal Code of 2005 §23, stating that ‘anyone contravening the 
requirement for acceptable conduct in an area, and who can be blamed on the basis of their 
personal assumptions, is negligent’, thus appears to be relatively apposite. Even though it 
is not always stated as explicitly in the judgements, the arbitrary penalties to which the 
women were sentenced may thus be regarded as a result of negligence.
If this theory was used as a basis, we could state that the strengthened position for 
the assessment of subjective liability and other excusing elements had two consequences. 
Firstly, it meant that the judges in the court of first instance could legitimately circum-
vent the death penalty, even if the conditions of the rules on concealment of birth and 
infanticide were met. Secondly, it meant that the women could still be sentenced as their 
negligent actions were identified and recognised as reprehensible. Both of these changes 
nevertheless illustrate the same thing, that is to say a gradual move away from the strict 
legal positivistic appliance of statutory law and towards a more nuanced assessment of 
liability.
8. Summary and Discussion of Causes 
As we have seen, there was a relatively major transition in the mid-18th century where – 
inter alia, assessments of causative links and subjective liability were given greater scope 
in cases of infanticide. In legal theory, the earliest time at which this was expressed was 
in Hedegaard’s dissertation of 1756, while intent as a condition for the death penalty was 
formulated initially in Nørregaard’s lectures in the 1780s. Even so, there were signs of a 
development in the same direction in district court practice even before these sources 
were published. If we view the discussions of criminal liability in a rough timeline, we 
can say that the assessments seem to be rather scarce and unnuanced in the period before 
57 SAB: Rettsprotokoll Sunnhordland 1782-1787 fs. 318, corresponding to the following in SAB: 
Rettsprotokoll Sunnhordland 1777-1782 fs. 26b.
58 SAB: Rettsprotokoll Sunnhordland 1741-1746 fs. 111, SAB: Rettsprotokoll Sunnhordland 1772-
1777 fs. 166 and SAB: Rettsprotokoll Sunnhordland 1787-1792 fs. 182.
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1735, more elements were incorporated between 1736 and 1774 but still had few conse-
quences, while the altered legal perception after 1774 appeared to play a central part in 
explaining why more women avoided the death penalty. 
Thus this development appears to have taken place over a longer period of time, and 
consequently it is difficult to say for sure what the triggering cause of this change was. As 
stated, the substantial law was the same throughout the entire period investigated, and 
so it is necessary to look at other, and external -factors. The year in which we see the first 
signs of a change in district court practice also provides an indicator of what may have 
heralded the start of the development that would gradually have major consequences. 
In the mid-1730s, two ordinances of major significance to district court practice came 
into being. It is probably no coincidence that we see the first signs of change when these 
came into force. The first of these, the Administration of Justice Ordinance II of 1735, in-
cluded two new regulations that probably both had consequences for the legal discourse 
that was conducted locally.59 Firstly, the obligatory appeal was extended to apply to all 
serious criminal cases. As the district court judge was obliged to pay compensation for 
illegal verdicts, mandatory review of the appellant court probably increased awareness 
of the formulation of the judgements.60 Furthermore, the accused was allocated public 
defence counsel. Even though the expertise of the defence counsel appointed did vary, 
we can in several cases see a clearly more nuanced evaluation of excusing elements as a 
consequence of a well-trained procurator. Twice as many skills were on hand with two 
legal players, and the foundation was laid for a local legal debate. 
The second ordinance that probably had major consequences for the law practised 
was the Examination Ordinance of 1736. As of this year, all legal players were obliged to 
complete an examination in law. Despite the fact that the syllabus was limited initially 
and that it naturally took some time to implement the ordinance in practice,61 the exam-
ination preparation and lectures provided the entire spectrum of future appliers of the 
law with a collective base of knowledge.62 Unpublished manuscripts and notes that were 
initially intended for sitting examinations could thus also include a broad spectrum of 
appliers of the law in the ongoing debates.63 The more extensive commentaries prepared 
in the decades that followed therefore not only formed the basis for the gradual develop-
ment of a legal fellowship, but were also a result of it. It was perhaps a collective under-
standing of this kind that gave the district court judges in the county of Hordaland the 
59 Sunde, ‘Enhver Borger har ret til at fordre Sikkerhed af staten’ - Ordninga med offentleg forsvarar 
mellom 1735 og 1775, Rettshjelp fra kyst til vidde. Festskrift til jusshjelpa i Nord-Norge (2009) pp. 
322-342, at 324. 
60 Norwegian Code of 1687 1-5-3.
61 See Nilsen 2002 p. 40.
62 See Sunde 2007a p. 148.
63 Sunde, Fornuft og erfarenhed (Det juridiske fakultet, Universitetet i Bergen 2007b) pp. 149-152.
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desire and skills to supplement the strict and apparently unnuanced legal text in the rules 
on concealment of birth with broader assessments, in order to achieve more reasonable 
results.
In addition to extending legal expertise, there was also better access to evidence. For 
example, the mandatory autopsy of 1751 gave the law a more authoritative source on 
which the judges could base conclusions relating to the child’s chances of living. These 
investigations were also discussed in detail in works such as Hedegaard’s, and thus it 
appears as though increasing emphasis was placed on this element in practice.64 Thus 
greater medical expertise may also have been an important factor in this development.65
It is difficult without a more extensive and broad survey to provide a concrete and 
indisputable response as to what caused this change in legal life. According to what we 
have seen, it does not appear as though the lawyers themselves always perceived or were 
capable of defining what legal operations they were actually undertaking. Despite the lin-
guistic and theoretical obstacles, nevertheless we can see that these assessments in con-
cealment of birth and infanticide cases in the 17th and 18th century appear to represent 
an important step towards the modern conception of liability. 
64 See Hedegaard 1756 pp. 51-59.
65 See also Shiøtz, Svarene ligger i kroppen in Historier om Helse Oslo 2009, pp. 19-33.
